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As a philosophical and anthropological concept, the importance of 
interpassivity today seems secured, thanks in no small part to Robert 
Pfaller’s tireless efforts over the last two decades.1 Beginning life as a 
conceptual weapon in Pfaller’s late-90’s polemic against interactive art, 
interpassivity has since shed light on domains as different as rhetoric,2 
religion3 and popular culture.4 A striking feature of Pfaller’s work in this 
period, in addition to its impressive scope, is his constant attention to the 
way interpassivity might inform political theory and practice.5 Here, I track 
Pfaller’s thoughts on interpassivity as he transports the concept from art, 
to the politics of art, and finally to politics proper. My aim is to understand 
the various levels of significance interpassivity has in Pfaller’s thought, 
particularly as it is related to politics. Towards the end of this paper, I 
briefly bring Pfaller’s thought into dialogue with the work of Alain Badiou 
and Jacques Rancière, and assess the degree to which his polemic 
against the Left’s call for increased participation in politics is consistent 
— albeit paradoxically so — with the way these two thinkers relate 
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politics to equality and to the category of the impossible. My chief 
reference will be Pfaller’s recent book Interpassivity: The Aesthetics of 
Delegated Enjoyment, though I will also draw on his masterwork On the 
Pleasure Principle in Culture: Illusions Without Owners,6 first published in 
German in 2002.7 
 
To see what’s at stake in thinking about interpassivity and politics, 
consider the following passage from Interpassivity, a work that brings 
together some of Pfaller’s most ground-breaking essays published 
between 2003 and 2013. Pfaller writes:  
 
Thinking about interpassivity […] means no less than investigating 
a basic, unquestioned assumption of most emancipatory 
movements since 1968, namely the assumption that active is 
better than passive, subjective better than objective, own better 
than foreign, changeable better than permanent, immaterial better 
than material, constructed better than essential, and so on.8 
 
As this passage suggests, interpassivity promises not only to 
illuminate the human sciences in general, but also to rectify certain 
theoretical errors that allegedly handicap the Left’s politics. In the most 
polemical essay from Interpassivity, ‘Against Participation’, Pfaller argues 
that the apparently progressive injunction to increase participation in 
politics — to make people more “active” — has become a “trap”9 for the 
Left10 since it has obscured the differences between distinct forms of 
participation in public life, ultimately giving succour to today’s reigning 
“narcissistic cultural conditions”.11 With a renewed appreciation for 
interpassivity, Pfaller implies, the Left will be better able to propose 
directives that won’t cause its politics to devolve into the more nefarious 
forms of identity politics, nor provide de facto support for neoliberal policy 
measures. 
 
 Formulated in these terms, Pfaller’s intervention into contemporary 
political thought has a distinctly counterintuitive appeal. Why might we 
privilege forms of passivity over activity, particularly in politics? What can 




the theory of interpassivity offer us that the Left’s political thought of the 
last half-century has either neglected or misconstrued?  
 
To appreciate the subtly of Pfaller’s claims, it’s best to return to his 
arguments against the “spontaneous philosophy”12 of interactive act, the 
place where interpassivity’s conceptual life began. While Pfaller admits 
that this original enemy “has now largely vanished into thin air”,13 in my 
view his polemic against interactivity in art contains the core of his 
thought on interpassivity’s role in political life. Instead of immediately 
spelling out what interpassivity consists in, I’ll first allow its conceptual 
contours to become visible in Pfaller’s polemic, before treating it with 
greater precision further on.  
 
The Spontaneous Philosophy of Interactive Art 
 
In the ‘Introduction’ to Interpassivity, Pfaller narrates that in the last two 
decades of the 20th century, many artists felt a diffuse yet intense pressure 
to make their artworks more “interactive”.14 There were a number of 
interrelated reasons for this, at once historical, political and theoretical. 
Politically speaking, there was an apparent resurgence at the time of the 
avant-gardist idea according to which it was essential to “dissolv[e] […] 
the separation between the performer and the viewer”.15 This resurgence 
was doubtless inspired by the rise of civilian internet use in the early to 
mid-1990’s and its promise of a fully interactive public sphere.16 The idea 
this imperative was based on — that artworks are deficient if they don’t 
allow their prospective audiences to participate in their creation — had 
nevertheless been in circulation since the avant-gardes of the early 20th 
century.17 When artworks leave no space for the public’s involvement, this 
argument runs, audience members are automatically placed in the 
position of passive spectators subject to the intellectual and affective 
power of the artwork. They are seduced by the ideas and beliefs it 
expresses, their “pleasure” a sure sign of their complete “identification”18 
with the ideology the artwork espouses. At the same time, professional 
artists jealously appropriate for themselves the collective’s capacity for 
artistic creation. Instead of allowing audience members to showcase 
their inherent creative potential, artists privatize artistic production and 




habituate everyone else to thinking they can only ever be consumers of 
art, not creators in their own right. 
 
 There is an obvious analogy in this discourse between art and 
politics. That is, if audience members switch from being passive 
consumers to active contributors in the domain of art, then they are far 
more likely to want to take their political destiny in their hands as well. As 
Pfaller narrates, the new artistic movements of the 1980’s and 90’s took 
up these century-old ideas and again imagined art as a training ground 
for political engagement. Instead of the Surrealist’s “collective 
unconscious” or the “events” of the Fluxus group, however, we now had 
“interactive high-tech installations and participatively structured low-
budget fields of action in which everyone [could] join in”.19 
 
 For Pfaller, these examples of interactive art represented less a 
new artistic movement bolstered by a compelling theory of art and more 
a case of wishful thinking. They encapsulated modern artists’ 
spontaneous desire for political influence at the same time as they 
produced new concrete forms that seemed to promise this desire’s long-
delayed fulfilment. Unlike the theory of interpassivity, which opened up 
new and unpredictable paths of inquiry,20 on Pfaller’s account 
“interactivity” was a discourse that had all of the answers in advance — 
even if it could never quite justify them. 
 
 The essence of Pfaller’s arguments against interactivity in art 
comes down to the following claim: far from divesting people of agency, 
artworks that maintain a distinction between “performer” and “viewer”,21 
“transmitter” and “receiver”,22 or “stage” and “auditorium”,23 actually give 
people capacities. Reciprocally, “interactive” art risks narrowing their 
domain of possible action. 
 
To understand this unexpected claim, let’s begin with a question: 
what do people bring to an artwork when they participate in its creation? 
As I’ve already intimated, Pfaller’s answer to this question is informed by 
an account of today’s “narcissistic cultural conditions”,24 which he draws 
from the work of Richard Sennett, among others.25 In such a context, 




when individuals are called upon to participate — whether in art or in 
political life — they typically understand this as a summons to bring 
something of themselves to the situation. They think they are being 
asked to speak and act as egos possessing an “authentic”26 self that 
merits being paraded in public. Correlatively, in their engagement with 
others individuals feel they must remain faithful to this self and not allow 
the homogenising force of the public sphere to diffuse it. Indeed, it 
matters little if this self is commendable in others’ eyes or not: as Pfaller 
sardonically notes, we’re more than ready these days to welcome 
philanderers and necrophiles onto any number of daytime talk shows.27  
 
Pfaller sees most instances of interactive art as continuous with 
this narcissistic culture: “Better familiar than foreign!”28 is the watchword 
not only of consumer culture but also of much participatory art. Rather 
than being confronted with pieces that challenge their beliefs, when 
asked to help create an artwork individuals tend to contribute something 
of what they already know and value. Since they are now responsible for 
it, the temptation exists for them to avoid investing the artwork with 
disconcerting or dangerous ideas that they couldn’t enthusiastically 
assume in the mode of an ideal identification. Similarly, when it’s a matter 
of the collective production of an artwork, the emphasis is placed on 
harmonious and mutually-reinforcing interactions with others. As Pfaller 
notes, in such conditions it’s unlikely that political ideas that risk splitting 
participants into opposing camps of “friends” and “enemies” can ever be 
explored. While such collective works think of themselves as staging 
ideal political forms that emphasise cooperation and creativity, for Pfaller 
they actually make politics — understood as the site of irreducible 
antagonisms — vanish. In short, while interactive art appears to make 
people more active and even to “return”29 certain capacities to them, in 
reality it confines action to the libidinal circuit of the ego and robs 
collective life of its properly antagonistic substance.  
 
But if interactive art reduces the scope of individuals’ activity, how 
do artworks that maintain a clear division between “stage” and 
“auditorium” expand it? How can Pfaller’s concept of interpassivity shed 
light on these hitherto unperceived virtues of “traditional” artworks? How 




might it help us conceive of different forms of participation that escape 
the egological trap?  
 
This is an ideal point to offer a more in-depth discussion of 
interpassivity itself. In my view, the best point of entry into interpassivity is 
the much broader concept of “illusions without owners”. Along with 
interpassivity, this concept lies at the heart of Pfaller’s thought.30 Take the 
performance of a religious ritual: while I carry out the requisite gestures, 
in my psychical interiority I can simultaneously entertain all kinds of 
thoughts, including the thought that my religion is implausible, stupid, or 
just plain boring. Nevertheless, as seen from the “outside”, my ritual 
gestures rigorously attest to my faith. Or rather, they do so for a “naive 
observer”:31 that is, for someone who is “only concerned with external 
appearances”32 and who doesn’t think to delve too deeply into my 
intentions, as an inquisitor might.33 Returning to the concept of “illusions 
without owners”, in this instance it is the “naive observer” who has such 
an “illusion”: specifically, the illusion that I’m performing the ritual with full 
attention and subjective faith. Of course, nobody else present really 
thinks this is the case: this is precisely why it is “nobody’s illusion”.34 But in 
allowing me this space between my subjective life and my outward, 
objective existence, the other followers of my religion are not acting 
cynically. On the contrary, they are making it possible for the religion to 
function at all. By way of this “illusion without a present owner”, religious 
life continues in all of its objective forms, while its “believers” are divested 
of the overly-demanding — if not impossible — duty of demonstrating 
their perfect adherence to its strictures.  
 
How might the concept of “illusions without owners” work in art 
more specifically? In the chapter ‘The Work of Art That Observes Itself’, 
Pfaller briefly remarks on Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet. He wonders 
whether it’s the case — as some critical theories might argue35 — that my 
emotional investment in Romeo’s destiny means “I not only sympathise 
with a person, but accept the whole presupposed structures of 
Renaissance class division, heterosexual monogamy and so on”.36 Does 
my pleasure in the artwork and in one character’s trajectory betray my 
unconscious adherence to what is essentially feudalism? Do my hopes 




for the lovers mark me out as a traitor to today’s politically-correct 
opinion? 
 
In no way, answers Pfaller. Taking pleasure in the artwork doesn’t 
mean identifying with it narcissistically. On the contrary: I don’t adhere to 
feudalism at all. And yet, in my consumption of Romeo and Juliet I project 
an invisible viewer — a “naive observer” lacking all of the sensitivities of a 
good 21st century leftist — who does enjoy in an unmediated fashion the 
ideas and values that the play espouses. This observer is decidedly not 
me — nor is it anyone in the audience of a present-day production of the 
play. Yet by delegating my pleasure to them I can enjoy the play through 
their imagined enjoyment without having to give up my political 
convictions. This is interpassivity: instead of experiencing certain 
pleasures myself, I allow someone else to do so in my place. I outsource 
my passivity — my receptivity to pleasure — to an other.37   
 
Before we transition from art to politics proper, a few words are in 
order regarding the nature of the intersubjective relations that arise when 
such a “naive observer” is in play in a discourse or a collective practice. 
When Pfaller writes that this observer is the carrier of “nobody’s illusion”, 
he means that “nobody” in a given social group — for instance, in today’s 
audiences of Romeo and Juliet — is under the sway of this illusion. The 
“naive observer” need not coincide with any person present. There are 
salutary effects produced by this outsourcing of pleasure and belief. 
Consider what would happen if, by contrast, the slightest sign of 
enjoyment on my part of Romeo and Juliet was taken by others to signal 
my secret commitment to compulsory heterosexuality or patriarchal 
social relations. Rather than have the time and space to consider the play 
in all of its complexity, I would be forced to expend enormous amounts of 
psychical energy pre-emptively repressing this pleasure (an impossible 
task, since affects always find a way of coming out). Guilt would then 
ensue, followed by resentment for all those who let themselves enjoy 
spontaneously without doing any of the hard work of ideological 
purification. I would be moved to use the play as a means of proving my 
incorruptibility. At the same time, my relations with others would be 
marred by intense suspicion and games of one-upmanship: each of us 




would seek to purge any trace of pleasure from ourselves and from 
others, before purging those deemed to have failed in this difficult task. In 
short, rather than a community of critically-minded individuals capable of 
reflecting together on the play’s content, we would get a form of cultural 
Terror that would stunt all of our capacities.  
 
To return to Pfaller’s polemic against interactive art, we can now 
catch a glimpse of a virtue of maintaining the distinction between 
audience and artwork. As Pfaller suggests, by keeping audience 
members at a distance from the artwork, there is less pressure on them 
to identify with it in a narcissistic mode. Such a structure thus constitutes 
a local site of resistance to one of contemporary society’s dominant 
tendencies. For in today’s climate of generalised egotism, it is not only lay 
participants who are likely to claim that the interactive artwork represents 
them (read: their ideal ego); others are likely to interpret these individuals’ 
actions as the emanations of an ego as well, and consequently to expect 
from them “authentic” expressions of their adherence to the artwork’s 
values. Again, this risks making it impossible to explore controversial, or 
even tasteless, ideas. However, if our encounters with artworks are 
mediated by a “naive observer” who shoulders the weight of illusions 
belonging to nobody, we are much more capable of engaging with 
difficult works. As Pfaller writes with reference to the theatre, with 
interpassivity as a mediating screen between the performance and the 
audience, actors “can act in a sarcastic or cynical — or even excessively 
naive — way and play something evil”.38 By means of interpassivity, 
everyone present knows they are dealing with an entirely fictional scene 
where all actions occur according to an “as if”39 structure: actors act “as if” 
they were really “evil”, while the audience enjoys the work “as if” they 
were really seduced by the characters’ wicked ways. But again, the 
person who really believes or enjoys the “evil” isn’t present: they are the 
“naive observer” to whom all of the work’s values are attributed. 
Meanwhile, the actually existing audience members can at once enjoy 
the work and engage with the difficult ideas it presents, without wasting 
time proving their ideological purity to one another. 
 




We can see now how interpassivity clarifies the critical virtues of 
maintaining a division of labour between artists and audience, along with 
a functional distinction between stage and auditorium. Concomitantly, 
we can see how interactive art plays into the hands of today’s 
widespread narcissism: instead of expanding subjects’ capacities for 
action, it reduces everything to the level of Lacan’s Imaginary register. Of 
course, Pfaller admits that this need not be the destiny of all interactive 
art: no rule stipulates that audiences have to participate in the guise of 
their ideal egos.40 Rather, interactive art might well be a space where 
participants can take on a role that they play in an “as if” mode. They 
could thereby explore something beyond the confines of their ideal 
identifications.  
 
Playing the Impossible  
 
By exploring Pfaller’s thoughts against interactive art, we’ve discovered 
that his polemic against participation is only against certain forms of 
participation: specifically, those that mobilise individuals’ egos. Even 
more significant, however, is the discovery that the theory of 
interpassivity might help clarify what forms of participation in public and 
political life we should actually strive for. In other words, Pfaller ultimately 
writes in favour of participation, albeit of a purified kind.  
 
To see some of the salutary effects of interpassivity in public life, 
let’s begin by considering Pfaller’s remarks on politeness: 
 
politeness is itself a game — a ‘comedy’ according to Alain: 
everyone is invited to stand back from oneself a little, not to take 
oneself too seriously, as one might tend to do, and to play a role 
instead that is pleasant to others.41  
 
 A “naive observer” is clearly operative in games of politeness. I 
need not feel in my psychical interiority a pressing concern for others’ 
feelings; I need only act “as if” I did. Once again, it’s the “naive observer” 
concerned exclusively with “external appearances” who judges — both 
for myself and for others — whether my polite gestures are sufficiently 




convincing. When we encounter one another in “polite” society each of 
us therefore plays a role that is minimally “fake”: we feign interest in each 
others’ lives, make self-deprecating remarks about ourselves, and pursue 
lines of conversation that might contradict our innermost feelings. The 
point, of course, is not to deceive others. In any case, this is impossible: 
politeness is “a deception with no one deceived”,42 as Kant recognised 
long ago. Rather, we play these “fake” roles so as to allow a shared 
space of discussion to emerge; a space where our individual 
idiosyncrasies, our hatreds and hang-ups, simply don’t feature. By 
applying Pfaller’s theory of interpassivity to the public sphere, we see that 
the relevant opposition is not between the perverse artificiality of public 
life and the authentic expression of self that occurs in the private sphere. 
Rather, it is between forging a common discursive space concerned with 
collective goods on the one hand, and aggressively asserting the truth of 
our ideal selves on the other.  
 
 Pfaller clearly thinks that a renewed appreciation for interpassivity 
can encourage us to construct a public sphere less encumbered by 
aggressive demands for recognition and more attuned to truly public 
questions — questions of distribution, of shared history, and of justice. 
For beyond liberal platitudes about the “personal” (read: the egological) 
being political, these questions necessarily require us to abstract from 
our individual idiosyncrasies and consider ourselves and others in terms 
of our relative social anonymity. The theory of interpassivity promises to 
make us sensitive once again to specificity of the language games we 
should ideally play in public. It also shows us that these games can be 
more liberating — indeed more humorous — than the ego-talk currently 
flooding the public sphere with petty resentments and delusions of 
grandeur. 
 
Pfaller takes this argument a step further in On the Pleasure 
Principle in Culture. There, he claims that when subjects tend to identify 
directly with systems of ideas or values — that is, when they draw their 
“ideal egos” and “ego ideals” from them, rather than attributing belief in 
these systems to a “naive”, inexistent other — they inevitably experience 
any pleasures that don’t correspond with these “ideals” as profoundly 




disturbing occurrences: they feel guilty for having failed to live up to the 
standards required of them. Consequently, they turn to forms of ascetism 
and make a virtue of their ability to resist pleasures, simultaneously 
reacting with anger, disgust and scornfulness to those they see as 
having given in to them.43 For Pfaller, this unholy alliance between 
narcissism and ascetism has provided the perfect ideological conditions 
for neoliberal governments since the early 1980’s to pursue austerity 
measures that demand populations accept the wholesale destruction of 
institutions that once guaranteed them more comfortable, fulfilling lives. 
He writes: 
 
These affects shape those ideological conditions under which 
people not only accept, but actively affirm politics that harm them. 
The most obvious phenomena resulting from the current, ascetic 
affective organisation of the masses is the joy in ‘rational’ 
appreciation of supposedly necessary ‘austerity measures’, and 
the affected persons’ active compliance in the neoliberal attacks 
on their own most immediate interests — such as social security, 
pension plans, education, infrastructure, and so on.44 
 
Pfaller’s work suggests that the Left’s call for increased 
participation, insofar as this has taken the form of participation by 
individuals qua egos, has thus long been complicit with the Right’s 
attempts to dismantle the welfare state and to replace solidarity with 
sacrifice — both of one’s own living conditions and those of others. Thus, 
in addition to neutralizing the narcissism of identity politics, learning to 
live again with our pleasures through forms of interpassivity would help 
remove what Pfaller identifies as one of the “key ideological pillars of 
today’s seemingly omnipotent neoliberal politics”:45 the ascetism that 
arises from pursuing “self-esteem” over simple “joy”.46  
 
 The power of Pfaller’s concept of interpassivity to clarify the stakes 
of today’s dominant ideology, not to mention to guide us as we try to 
resist it, is undeniable. In the remainder of this paper, I’d therefore like to 
bring his work into dialogue with two other philosophers who have also 
offered compelling accounts of how we might struggle against the 




rampant inequality unleashed by neoliberal capitalism: Alain Badiou and 
Jacques Rancière. To the best of my knowledge, Pfaller has never written 
on Badiou’s work, though he has critiqued Rancière’s account of the 
politics of art, albeit only briefly.47 How might Pfaller’s work on 
interpassivity connect with the central place these two French 
philosophers accord equality in their political thought? My claim will be 
that interpassivity’s political horizon is potentially egalitarian.  
 
 To begin with, it’s worth noting that for Pfaller interpassivity has 
more than a conjunctural significance politically: it entails a discovery 
concerning the nature of subjects’ submission to ideologies in general 
and to the social systems these ideologies help perpetuate. This 
discovery consists in the idea that subjects have an intrinsic capacity to 
subtract themselves from the predicates they possess in a given political 
situation — at least in part. That is, while interpassive subjects might 
appear outwardly to be engaged in the practices of some belief system 
like Christianity or capitalism, their interpassivity allows them to attribute 
a sincere adherence to these doctrines to a “naive” other — someone 
who precisely isn’t them. Consequently, such interpassive subjects can 
never be said to be completely Christian or capitalists, for in reality they 
expend a heap of psychical energy trying not to be these things. 
Interpassivity thus shows us that the power of an ideology can never be 
total; concomitantly, it demonstrates that subjects always have a trick up 
their sleeve should they wish to resist being subjectivized by an ideology: 
the trick of interpassivity.48     
 
 This subtractive capacity implied by interpassivity should resonate 
with readers of Badiou and Rancière. For these two thinkers, politics 
consist in subjects speaking and acting both from and for a position that 
doesn’t coincide with any existing position in a structured political 
situation: specifically, a position of equality. Since all existing political 
situations are structured by way of an unequal distribution of capacities 
for thought and action, for Badiou and Rancière true political change 
comes about only when subjects effectively verify that all are capable of 
intervening with equal import in the affairs of the collective to determine 
its egalitarian political destiny. Doing politics therefore always means 




becoming something unrecognisable from the perspective of 
established ideas regarding people’s political capacities.49  
 
 Intriguingly, at one point in Interpassivity Pfaller writes that 
interpassive subjects are similarly “impersonal”:50 their most intimate 
being can’t be identified with any existing subject position. Furthermore, 
as we’ve seen above, Pfaller’s account of the political virtues of 
interpassivity all turn around the way it allows subjects to strip 
themselves of their individual particularities so as to better engage with 
issues affecting all citizens of a polis indiscriminately. Being interpassive 
means being no one — no one with any clearly-identifiable interests, 
beliefs or capacities. Might interpassivity’s political horizon — the ideal it 
at once augurs and helps bring about — thus be consistent with the 
practices of equality that both Badiou and Rancière affirm? 
 
 Before answering this question, two words of warning about 
hastily adopting interpassivity as an intrinsically egalitarian concept. First, 
Pfaller’s own writings present a mixed assessment of interpassive 
practices. He is well aware that such practices don’t necessarily augur 
the overthrow of an ideological system. Rather, as his own example of 
religion shows, they can help them persevere in their being. As an 
interpassive Christian, for instance, not only can I keep the flame of faith 
burning — at least objectively; I can also enjoy thinking of myself as less 
of a dupe than other Christians. In such cases, interpassivity means 
ideologies can live on by means of a toxic mixture of psychotic faith and 
narcissistic contempt, without any end in sight. Second (and here I take 
up a suggestion briefly made by Pfaller himself), interpassivity can 
function as a purely descriptive term for the way social groups define 
themselves negatively with respect to others. As we saw, in the concrete 
the phrase “nobody’s illusions” actually resolves into the phrase “nobody 
in a given social group’s illusions”. Thus, a social group can be united by 
each of its member not being the “naive” other who really believes in or 
enjoys a certain phenomenon.51 At the same time, however, this “naive” 
other need not be entirely inexistent, as Pfaller often suggests they are.52 
Rather, it is more than possible that it correspond to another social group 
that is constituted as, precisely, the “naive” other who really believes or 




enjoys. In other words, while interpassivity can suggest a resistance to 
being a subject of an ideology, it can also betray a more profound 
allegiance to a social imaginary in which certain “naive” or even “stupid” 
others figure — others who are thought to really exist in the form of 
political, ethnic or cultural groups different to one’s own. Moreover, as 
Pfaller’s own remarks suggest, there is a resistance on the part of such 
social imaginaries to change. In the case of what he calls 
“disconnection-type” relations to the other, the delegation of pleasure or 
belief is not only necessary in order to avoid a certain psychic tension, it 
also has to be secured by conclusively othering the “naive” other 
involved. As Pfaller writes, such “disconnection-types” of delegation 
“mak[e] acts necessary that confirm a disconnection”53 between the 
subject who enjoys or believes interpassively and the other who is really 
duped by certain ideas or practices. Social groups can therefore have a 
profound interest in cultivating an ideology in which other groups are 
framed as irredeemably “naive” or “stupid”.  In such cases, interpassivity 
seems less a weapon that can help fight for a better world and more just 
another tool in the sociologist’s already-well-equipped toolbox. It seems 
very distant from a politics of equality. 
 
These two caveats aside, it still seems pertinent to insist on the 
promising points of connection between Pfaller’s work and the political 
thought of Badiou and Rancière. Recall first, however, that Pfaller framed 
his theory of interpassivity as a counter to the Left’s injunction to increase 
participation in politics. Given that both Badiou and Rancière understand 
politics as the effective verification on the part of those excluded from the 
management of the collective’s existence that they have equal capacity 
to participate in collective life — and to do so by steering the collective in 
the direction of greater equality — it initially appears paradoxical to align 
their thought with Pfaller’s. For at one very obvious level, both Badiou and 
Rancière argue for increased participation. And yet, as we know, Pfaller’s 
thought is only opposed to participation if it means the participation of 
individuals qua egos. Thus, just as Badiou and Rancière see politics as a 
practice where individuals become impersonal, their pre-political 
identities having been determined by a situation of inequality (thereby 
making their political pursuit of equality entirely indiscernible relative to 




their starting situation), so does Pfaller imagine political life as a site 
where individuals ideally become anonymous: equal in their lack of 
identity, in being no-one. Pfaller’s account of interpassivity suggests that it 
might be one practice among others that would work effectively in the 
direction of equality. 
 
What’s intriguing is that Pfaller also makes repeated reference to 
the category of the “impossible” in his discussion of the political efficacy 
of interpassive practices. As is well known, the “impossible” constitutes 
the key category that Badiou and Rancière mobilise in their political 
though. For them, what is “impossible” is precisely equality itself since 
existing situations are built on the constitutive denial that all people are 
equally capable of thinking and acting with regard to collective life.54 For 
Badiou and Rancière, politics involves local attempts to make the 
impossible possible; to verify the efficacy of equality in the midst of its 
negation. 
 
 There is nevertheless a homonymy operative here in the use that 
Badiou, Rancière and Pfaller put the category of the impossible to. In 
conclusion, it’s worthwhile clarifying the different senses of the 
impossible in their discourses in order to bring Pfaller’s own distinct 
contribution better into focus.  
 
On a number of occasions when writing about art, Pfaller argues 
that one politically effective technique available to artists is to occupy an 
“impossible” position, one that nobody else in the field can take up.55 
Elsewhere, as we know, he describes this “impossible” position as an 
“impersonal”56 one since it falls between the cracks of individuals’ existing 
sites of subjectivization. As an example of such an “impossible” position, 
take Pfaller’s discussion of the work Please Love Austria by Christoph 
Schlingensief in his 2016 article ‘The Efficiency of Ideology and the 
Possibilities of Art’. As a provocation to both Left and Right, in the year 
2000 Schlingensief set up two shipping containers in the middle of 
Vienna, which he claimed held immigrant workers. He then invited the 
public to vote, Big Brother-style, on which worker should be expelled first: 
“the cook from Kenya or the engineer from Vietnam”57?  An outcry ensued, 




with outraged leftists trying to “free” the immigrant workers while rightists 
accused Schlingensief of being a neo-Nazi. By making explicit the secret 
wishes of a contemporary racism informed by consumer culture, 
Schlingensief took up an “impossible” position that no one else dared 
occupy, thereby forcing the right in particular to confront the racist 
fantasies at the heart of its politics. From the perspective of interpassivity 
theory, most of Schlingensief’s furious respondents obviously attributed 
the enjoyment contained in the artwork directly to him, as opposed to an 
inexistent other.  Yet they could well have made a distinction between 
Schlingensief and the “naive” other who really enjoyed voting immigrants 
out of their country, and then use the artwork as a means of reflecting on 
the structure of contemporary Austrian politics. As Pfaller sums up the 
political efficacy of this artwork, “[e]ngaging individuals with a belief-
position that does not allow for identification prove[d] to be an efficient 
means to shatter predominant subject-effects”.58 By occupying an 
“impossible” position, Schlingensief illuminated what the “possible” 
positions in Austrian politics actually involved.  
 
 Now, the sense of “impossible” here is obviously not that of 
equality as the possibility that is absolutely foreclosed by an unequal 
situation, as it is in Badiou and Rancière’s thought. Rather, it names those 
statements or subject positions that constitute the disavowed or 
otherwise invisible substrata of a given ideological constellation, the 
exposure of which can lead to change. Thus, we have to retain a 
distinction in Pfaller’s thought between the specific political efficacy of art, 
which functions by way of a distinct actualisation of the “impossible”, and 
politics proper as a practice centred uniquely on making the impossible 
position of equality a real possibility. 
 
 To my mind, Pfaller’s own politics are ultimately consistent with 
this account of politics. Indeed, as I’ve suggested throughout, we can 
read his analysis of interpassivity as a lesson in how collectives might 
work without constant reference to their members’ egos, which is also to 
say without reference to the determinate positions they occupy in a 
given, unequal situation. Politics, then, really is about increased 
participation: not about increased participation on the part of egos or of 




our intra-situational selves, as Pfaller teaches us, but of ourselves as 
“impersonal” — even “impossible” — members of a generic humanity 
committed to verifying our equality. Pfaller’s work on interpassivity stands 
as a brilliant signpost on the path to this new world. 
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